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The last few weeks have been turbulent times in British politics (to say the least):
A new Prime Minister taking office after an internal vote of the members of the
conservative party; a Parliament unwilling to follow this new Government in any of
its proposals; 21 Conservative MPs being thrown out of the party as a consequence;
an opposition leader not voting for a snap election (with the Leader of the House
showing what he thinks of that by lying flat out on the first bench); a Prime Minister
indicating that he might be willing to disrespect the law; a prorogation of parliament
against its own will ending debates in one of the most crucial political times in
British history and finally a Scottish court ruling this prorogation unlawful (without
really knowing what this unlawfulness might lead to). As a constitutional lawyer
one therefore cannot help but ask: What is happening to the British Constitution?
What is going on with the political and parliamentary culture of a nation so proud
of its parliamentary history? And what about the Queen? In the following, I would
therefore like to share five very brief and somewhat unsystematic observations of
these recent developments from a German perspective. As a result I do believe
the current political elite is to blame for a lot of all this. But there are also significant
systemic problems regarding the structure of the British (unwritten) constitution.
2. Don’t mix direct and indirect democracy
The first observation is nothing really new and not even specifically Brexit-related: Be
careful when mixing direct and representative democracy. The referendum in 2016
is the reason for the current Brexit mess and I want to point to two severe theoretical
Problems of direct democracy it made visible. First of all: No one can be held
responsible in direct democratic procedures. As the people take the decision no one
can be seriously blamed and voted out of office for its consequences. It is always
the somewhat “wise and untouchable sovereign” that has spoken – in practice even
criticising the decision (no matter how stupid it may have been) appears difficult. This
is obviously different in a representative system where in the worst case we simply
vote for another Parliament. 
This directly leads to the second problem: the factual irreversibility of decisions taken
in a referendum. The reversibility of decisions is actually a central element of any
democratic order. Decisions can and will be reversed as soon as majorities change.
Parliament could thus of course decide to reverse the decision taken in 2016 (from
a legal perspective the referendum was not binding anyway). Politically, however,
parliament will obviously not be able to do so as this would appear undemocratic.
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So in case of a referendum the only somewhat legitimate institution able to reverse
the decision would be the people themselves. But here again: asking for a second
referendum would be (and actually is) perceived as being undemocratic for not
respecting the sovereign’s will as articulated in the first referendum. And this
dilemma also is the reason why Boris Johnson is able to claim to be protecting
democracy when circumventing parliament. So finally we might end up with a Brexit
that at the time it finally occurs is actually rejected by the majority of MPs and
possibly even the people only in order to respect a direct democratic decision taken
more than three years ago by a people that at the time – as anybody else – had no
idea what it was actually deciding upon. Now, to be clear: this is hardly a systemic
deficit of the British constitution. The fault for all this lies entirely with David Cameron
as the system itself might have allowed but clearly not requested to ask the people.
Future Prime Ministers should respect these experiences made and stop pretending
that direct democracy is of any higher value than indirect democracy. It all depends
on the questions asked.
3. Functioning frameworks
The last few years have seen significant changes in some constitutional frameworks
that in my view have at least contributed to some of the problems we are seeing
right now. The first one dates back to 2011: the Fixed Term Parliament Act. This
act specifically changed the competences of government when it comes to calling
a snap election, making the sort of “zombie government” possible we are seeing
at the moment: A government with no majority and thus unable to bring anything
through parliament yet unable to call for an election. Of course, such a situation
can occur in other parliamentary systems. However, the political culture in Britain
does not seem to have adjusted to this new situation yet, especially as it is not
common for members of the two leading parties to cooperate in order to form new
reliable majorities. As a consequence we now see a situation similar to that of a
presidential system with the executive and the legislative opposing each other, yet
without anyone who might act as problem solver and no political culture used to such
a situation. 
A second observation (that is not restricted to Britain) is a problematic development
concerning the selection process for party leaders. I believe we can see a growing
influence of ordinary party members. The conservative party used to select its
leader by its MPs and not too long ago switched to a general election process.
Labour adopted this system only in 2014. And we see similar, apparently democratic,
developments of course in the US, but now also in Germany (CDU and SPD). Now,
why am I mentioning this? Because I believe that neither Donald Trump nor Boris
Johnson would be the leader of their party and their country if we still had a system
where the elite of the parties had the last word. This might sound less democratic
at first and it probably is. However, a popular vote generally gives an advantage
to more populist characters. Why? Because no ordinary political party member
has anything to lose when voting for such tough and hard-line characters. MPs on
the other hand have an incentive to choose someone who is able to compromise
and ensure parliamentary majorities. Jeremy Corbyn might be popular with the
labour base, yet is somewhat disliked by the MPs of his own party. And the same
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is probably true for Boris Johnson – him getting rid of “obnoxious MPs” immediately
after the No-No-Deal vote serves my point. I do not really have an answer what
to do in this respect. I simply wanted to share my impression that the selection
process of the party leader might be of an even greater relevance for the stability of
a democracy than we thought so far.
4. Inter-institutional procedures
When looking at the parliamentary debates especially German scholars were
somewhat surprised to see the government’s influence on parliamentary procedures.
Government does not only decide almost entirely on the parliamentary agenda but
also has the possibility of proroguing Parliament – even against its own will. This is
completely different compared to the German parliament that acts autonomously
regarding all internal matters – especially its agenda. Now such a dependence
is obviously no problem in normal times when government can be sure to have a
majority in Parliament. But we see how such at first glance insignificant procedural
arrangements can complicate matters where this fundamental requirement is
missed. And in a fragmented society such situations might occur more often in the
future. So we might need some sort of amendment here not only allowing parliament
as a whole more influence but possibly also giving the opposition additional room to
influence parliamentary proceedings. 
5. Taking account of the voting system
The British voting system is somewhat legendary. The relative majority system has
led to a two party system in which Tory and Labour Prime Ministers alternate. In
parliament the Prime Minister sits opposite to the single leader of the opposition.
This system has worked for centuries and changing it rapidly would hardly appear
sensible. However, one should note that such a system only functions in a society
that is more or less divided amongst these two party lines. As we see in other
modern societies, however, this simple differentiation seems to have lost much
of its significance. Societies are getting more fragmented. We have more parties,
more interest groups and so on. And most important: We also see a split (or rather
a complete mess-up) within the parties themselves. A political system that is
founded on the idea of a homogenous government and a homogenous opposition
is hardly capable of dealing with such a situation. In the long run we will thus need
to think of how to mirror this development in the voting system, in order to ensure
the necessary parliamentary responsivity. And that might mean changing form a
majority to a proportionality voting system or at least to constituencies where more
than one MP is voted for (we can look to Ireland or Malta for instance and their
single transferable vote system). Of course the two big parties will currently veto
against such a change. But that does not alter the fact that we are currently seeing a
problematic representation deficit under the existing system. And no political system
will be able to keep up its legitimacy in such a situation for very long.
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6. The lacking problem solver
When Boris Johnson asked for the prorogation of parliament all eyes were directed
towards the Queen. Will she step in and ensure the rights of parliament? Will
she prevent Johnson from circumventing parliament in a time of crisis? We all
know the answer: no. And the media – not only the German media – soon justified
this decision with the apparent role the Monarchy has grown into in the last 100
years. According to these comments the Monarch is not supposed to interfere with
everyday politics but acts as an unpolitical institution. But is this really true? Can a
head of state actually remain “unpolitical” where it comes to the foundations of the
whole political system? When comparing this constitutional arrangement to others
we find that for instance the German Bundespräsident – though obviously not nearly
as glamourous as the Queen – is not reduced to mere representative functions but
in times of crisis can also act as a problem solver. We saw that, for instance after
the last election, with him more or less forcing the SPD into a coalition with Angela
Merkels CDU. And we find similar intervention rights of the Bundespräsident in
other times of crisis. The Monarch with all her authority therefore at least could have
interfered and rejected the prorogation proposal because it was of course no matter
of everyday politics but would have ensured parliamentary debate in a time of crisis.
Who else could have taken over such a role? We simply seem to be lacking some
sort of problem solver in the current system. Could the Supreme Court step in? Well
we will see how it decides. But laying our hopes into the judiciary might not be the
best solution in such a political crisis. Needed is rather an institution equipped with
the necessary authority in order to (re)integrate the whole of society. And let me add
as a German legal scholar: giving too much competences to a constitutional court
can have its shady side on the political process. 
7. Outlook: A written Constitution?
So who is to blame? The political elite or the system? As we learned recently from
Stephen Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt people will of course always matter as they
need to comply to a culture of institutional cooperation and forbearance. With the
prorogation of parliament and the threat to ignore the law Boris Johnson has in
my view (and in the view of the Scottish court) breached this necessity. But the
systemic deficiencies of the unwritten British constitution are hardly insignificant
and this should make us think. To construct a functioning democracy is complex
as the political system needs to reflect the current expectations of society. It
therefore needs to offer sufficient participation, sufficient limitations on governmental
powers but also sufficient efficiency. In my view we can see that the current system
thereby no longer fully reflects the respective expectations as far as participation
and efficiency is concerned – and that is independent from the people sitting in
parliament and the government. It therefore might be time to think about a written
constitution that tries to address these specific problems. The British constitution
has functioned for hundreds of years. But being old is no argument in itself when
it comes to generating the necessary legitimacy. Legitimacy takes place in the
present not in the past and it’s the present expectations that need to be met. Each
generation therefore requires a constitution matching its ideas of how democracy
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should function. And this is something the British political system will have to deal
with – within or outside the EU.
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